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The misuse of charities to finance terrorism
can pose a risk to South East Asian regional
security. Humanitarian aid that is delivered
through local charitable delivery partners
specifically to foreign conflict zones carries a
high risk of subversion. Recently, allegations
that Australian charitable funds were
misused to support terrorism overseas have
been in the news. This article discusses the
Australian case and suggests situationsensitive risk assessments and preventive
measures to address this problem. In
particular, a government can impose stricter
accountability conditions to deter misuse of
public funds it delivers to conflict zones
abroad through humanitarian charities.

Range of Terrorism Costs
A major terrorist organisation may perpetrate
large-scale attacks such as hijacking aircraft
or firing missiles at civilian targets, each
involving
detailed
preparation,
skilled
personnel,
travel
and
organisational
infrastructure. For instance, the four AlQaeda airliner attacks that targeted the US
on 11 September 2001 were estimated to
have cost up to US$500,000.1 A sustained
insurgency that utilises terrorist tactics may
involve thousands of combatants, support
staff,
weapons
acquisition,
training,
personnel and equipment movements,
accommodation, administration and logistics.
As such, the cost of staging an attack within
an insurgency is significant. An estimated
US$1.9 billion of funding was required to
sustain the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in 2014.2 The need for such significant
1

Nicholas Ryder, “Conclusions and
Recommendations.” In The Financial War on
Terrorism: A Review of Counterterrorism Financing
Strategies since 2001,” 173-183. United Kingdom:
Routledge, 2015.
2
Stefan Heissner, Peter R. Neumann, John HollandMcCowan, and Rajan Basrah, “Caliphate in Decline:
An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Resources
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation”,

funding can be a point of organisational
vulnerability. In the war against ISIS, oil
production facilities and other sources of
finance in Iraq were strategically targeted to
weaken the financial resources of the group.
On 11 January 2016, the United States (US)
bombed a bank in Mosul which destroyed
millions of paper dollars of IS cash reserves.
Even medium-scale terrorist attacks, such as
suicide bombings or explosive booby-traps,
require technical expertise, acquisition of
materials,
recruitment
and
publicity
strategies. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in
Indonesia is known to have targeted and
stolen from jewellery shops in order to
finance part of the US$74,000 cost of the
October 2002 Bali bombings.3 In comparison,
the London subway bombings perpetrated on
7 July 2005 are estimated to have cost less
than US$15,000. However, that cost should
not be determined in terms of operations and
equipment alone, as the terrorist attacks
were only a part of the group’s wider and
more extensive infrastructure.4
Lastly, lone wolf attacks and operations
represent low-scale terrorist attacks. These
smaller attacks, which include targeting
civilians with knives or cars, do not require
significant
technical
expertise
and
knowledge. Although lesser funds are
required, lone wolf attackers still need an
institutional support system that encourages,
publicises and rewards them for their actions.
For example, the Palestinian Authority stipends
King's College London, 2017, http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-inDecline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-FinancialFortunes.pdf (accessed December 31,2017).
3
Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, Countering the
Financing of Terrorism, 142. United Kingdom:
Routledge 2007.
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Recommendations.” In The Financial War on
Terrorism: A Review of Counterterrorism Financing
Strategies since 2001,” 124. United Kingdom:
Routledge, 2015.
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to the families of convicts and ‘martyrs’ who
have committed terrorist acts, are estimated to
5
cost over US$300 million per annum.

Ways to Finance Terrorism
The interconnections between transnational
organised crime and transnational terrorism
financing are increasingly evident. The
diverse sources of financing often vary with
the agenda and size of the terrorist
organisation and its operations. Terrorist
organisations that control substantial territory
such as ISIS, Hezbollah, Hamas, Boko
Haram and Al-Shabaab constantly require
increasing financial resources to expand and
sustain their operations. These groups own
‘legitimate’ businesses, impose taxes and
receive sizeable foreign private donations. In
addition, foreign state sponsorship is a longstanding source of finance for major terrorist
organisations. In this respect, the US State
Department annual country report on
terrorism has identified Iran as the leading
state sponsor of terrorism.6
Terrorist
organisations
are
criminal
enterprises capable of conducting diversified
illegal activities. These activities are often of
a transnational nature, and include
smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking,
wildlife poaching, coercive contributions,
credit fraud,
counterfeit
goods
and
embezzlement of charity funds or corporate
profits. For instance, it is well documented
that Hezbollah conducts drug trafficking in
Lebanon and Latin America, smuggles
cigarettes in the US, and counterfeits foreign

5

Patricia Zengerle “House passes measure to limit
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December 6, 2017,
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Yossi Kuperwasser Incentivizing Terrorism:
Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and
their Families Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs
2017, http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terroristscontradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-intentions/
(accessed December 31, 2017).
6
See Nicole Gaouette, “Iran Remains Top Terror
Sponsor as Global Attacks Decline”, CNN, July 19,
2017,
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/19/politics/statecountry-terror-report/index.html (accessed
December 31, 2017).

currency in Lebanon.7 While Al-Shabaab
kidnaps foreign merchant shipping crews on
the Indian Ocean for ransom and poaches
elephants to sell ivory in parts of Asia, Boko
Haram smuggles ‘conflict diamonds’ from
and extorts governors in West Africa. In
addition, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
makes
revenue
through
kidnapping
foreigners and demanding ransom.8
Terrorist organisations that incur high costs
are particularly vulnerable due to their strong
reliance on financing. The mix of financial
sources varies to suit the targets, modus
operandi and scale of terrorism operations.
This article will examine the utilisation of
international charitable funds as a major
source of terrorism financing, specifically
from an Australian perspective.
Charitable Sources of Terrorism Funding
Momentum to suppress terrorism funding
increased after the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombings
that targeted the US embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The
International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted
shortly after in 1999. Ratifications increased
in number after the Al-Qaeda attacks on the
US on 11 September 2001. Shortly
afterwards, the Financial War on Terrorism
which was launched under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1373 called for
the freezing of terrorist assets and prohibited
making funds, assets, resources or financial
services available to listed terrorists.
In October 2001, the Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which
aims to combat money laundering by
organised crime, adopted eight Special
Recommendations to detect, prevent and
suppress the financing of terrorism and
terrorist
acts.
One
additional
recommendation that was adopted in 2003
marked nine Special Recommendations that
were
added
to
the
original
40
7

Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of
Lebanon’s Part of God, 104,117,156-157, 274.
Georgetown: University Press, 2015.
8
Jim Gomez, “Abu Sayyaf Got $7.3 Million From
Kidnappings,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 27,
2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/835021/abusayyaf-got-7-3-million-fromkidnappings#ixzz54QIDQJGx (accessed December,
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recommendations for the prevention of
money laundering adopted in 1989. The
40+9
Recommendations
were
then
integrated together, revised and renumbered
in 2012. Recommendation 8 concerns
terrorism financing by charities and non-profit
organisations. It requires that FATF countries
review the adequacy of their respective laws
and regulations that relate to non-profit
entities that can be abused to finance
terrorism.9
Zakat, or Islamic charitable giving, is
particularly vulnerable to abuse. Social
welfare and funds for ‘jihadi resistance’
merge in some recipient organisations and
can be indistinguishable to donors. Examples
of charities around the world being subverted
to finance terrorism in other countries include
the Holy Land Foundation in the US,10 ISNAIslamic Services in Canada11 and INTERPAL
in the UK.12 In addition, several charities that
are based in the Middle East, such as the
IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in
Turkey and Union for Good in Saudi Arabia,
have been listed in some other jurisdictions,
including Germany, Israel and the US as
terrorist financing organisations.
In February 2016, a terrorism financing risk
assessment
workshop
for
Thailand,
Philippines and Malaysia identified four major
9

Financial Action Task Force, “International
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Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation” The FATF
Recommendations, updated November 2017,
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdf
s/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf
(accessed December 31, 2017).
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“No Cash for Terror: Conviction Returned in Holy
Land Cases”, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
November 25, 2008,
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/n
ovember/hlf112508 (accessed December 31, 2017)
11
Stewart Bell and Sean Craig, “Government
Revokes Group’s Charity Status, Audit Cites
Possible Funding Of Pakistani Militants” Global
News Canada, June, 19, 2017 ,
https://Globalnews.Ca/News/3606224/GovernmentRevokes-Groups-Charity-status-audit-citespakistani-militants/ (accessed December 31, 2017).
12
Alex Delmar-Morgan and Peter Oborne, “Why Is
The Muslim Charity Interpal Being Blacklisted As A
Terrorist Organisation”, The Telegraph, November
26, 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11255294/
Why-is-the-Muslim-charity-Interpal-being-blacklistedas-a-terrorist-organisation.html (accessed December
31, 2017).

risks of regional terrorism financing, which
included the misuse of charitable funds.13 As
a result of a growing concern in this sector, a
regional terrorism financing risk assessment
for non-profit organisations was conducted in
2017, which rated their risk as medium.
Indonesia faces the highest risk, as there are
337,000 known charities, and inevitably
some have links to terrorist organisations.14
Four Indonesian charities have been listed by
the UN Security Council for targeted financial
sanctions.15 Others have been identified on
national lists, such as Mujahedeen Kompak
(Indonesia), an organisation that channels
disaster relief funds towards political
violence.
Methods for using non-profit organisations to
finance terrorism include setting up bogus
charities for fundraising using social media
and crowd funding, and siphoning off funds
properly raised for social welfare to fuel
politically violent acts. Another method is for
personnel
of
bona
fide
non-profit
organisations to exploit their positions to
support terrorism by diverting funds and
resources. These methods are more effective
when the financial affairs of charities are less
transparent, which is often the case. When
the donors and the actual charity operations
are
located
in
different
countries,
jurisdictional
separation
obstructs
administrative
oversight
mechanisms
required
for
direct
organisational
accountability.
Case Study: Australian Charities Funding
Terror
Between 2012 and 2017, the Australian
government paid Habitat for Humanity
AUD$12.7 million (USD $10.1 million) for a
six-year development assistance project to
build classrooms, science laboratories and
school libraries in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim
Mindanao
in
the
southern

13

Agus Santoso and Sylvia Laksmi, “Regional
Terrorism Financing Framework: Southeast Asia and
Australia”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 8
(2016): 21.
14
Non-Profit Organisations and Terrorism Financing
– Regional Risk Assessment, Commonwealth of
Australia, 2017,
http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regionalNPO-risk-assessment-WEB-READY_ss.pdf
(accessed 2017).
15
Ibid.
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Philippines.16 However, Habitat for Humanity
subcontracted the project to Alhayam
Sultana Construction, which belonged to
members of the Maute family clan that had
publicly pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014.
The subcontract was terminated in late 2015
when Habitat for Humanity was sacked for
underperforming. However, the Maute clan
brothers who were responsible for the 2017
siege of Marawi city may have received
millions of dollars through the subcontracting.17
A recent Australian case further afield is the
diversion of charitable funds from World
Vision to Hamas in Gaza. World Vision is the
largest charitable group in Australia with
annual revenues exceeding AUD$400
million.18 According to Israeli prosecutors,
60% of World Vision’s annual operational
budget funding in Gaza was diverted by its
Gazan director to support Hamas. To
facilitate diversion of funds over ten years,
fictitious projects were created supposedly to
help farmers, the disabled and fishermen.
Methods like false registration of employees,
fictitious receipts and inflated invoices,
favouring complicit tenderers and disguising
warehouse transfers were used.19 The funds
financed the salaries of fighters in its alQassam Brigades,20 as well as infrastructure,
military weapons and salaries for officials.
From 2013 to 2016, the Australian federal
government had given away approximately

AUD$5 million (US$4 Million) to World Vision
Australia for projects in the Gaza Strip.21
Australian Risk Assessment of Charitable
Financing of Terrorism
In 2015, a FATF regional mutual evaluation
process concluded that Australia was not
compliant with Special Recommendation 8
on terrorism financing by non-profit
organisations. This was because it had not
conducted the required national review of the
adequacy of laws and regulations to
suppress terrorism financing in the charity
sector. Consequently, Australia’s first risk
assessment on countering terror financing
through charities and non-profit organisations
was released in August 2017 by the
Australian Transaction Reporting and
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the national
financial intelligence agency, together with
the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits
Commission (ACNC). The report of the
national risk assessment of the charities and
not-for-profit sector identified ‘significant
links’ between Australian charities and
organised crime, giving rise to a ‘medium’
risk. Between 2012 and 2016, there were 28
‘suspicious matter reports’ related to
terrorism financing received by AUSTRAC
that were worth AUD$5.6 million.22 These
involved charities that demonstrated a
sectoral capacity to quickly raise and
camouflage the movement of large amounts
of funds offshore to support individuals or
groups engaged in foreign conflict.23

16
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(accessed December 31,2017).
17
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(accessed December 31, 2017).
19
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the
Headlines: Hamas exploitation of World Vision in
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http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/Be
hind-the-Headlines-Hamas-exploitation-of-WorldVision-in-Gaza-to-support-terrorism-4-August2016.aspx (accessed December 31,2017).
20
Sophie McNeil, “World Vision Employee Pleads
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Broadcasting Service, February 3, 2017,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-03/worldvision-employee-pleads-not-guilty-to-funding-hamasin-gaza/8238000 (accessed December 31, 2017).

Established in 2013, the ACNC is a new
national regulator, designed to ‘maintain,
protect and enhance public trust and
confidence in the [Charities and Not-forProfit]
sector
through
increased
accountability and transparency; [to] support
21

Sophie McNeil, “Israeli Judge Allows New
Charges In World Vision Manager Accused Of
Diverting Millions To Hamas”, Australian
Broadcasting Service, January 13,2017,
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and sustain a robust, vibrant, independent
and innovative not-for-profit sector; and to
promote the reduction of unnecessary
regulatory obligations on the sector’.24 The
ACNC sets out record keeping standards for
charities and has monitoring powers.
However, whether a charity is audited
typically depends on its size and not
necessarily on its overseas activities.
Additionally,
there
are
no
special
requirements for Australian charities with
operations overseas. Special additional
requirements for monitoring external conduct
of charities that operate overseas are
provided for in the ACNC Act but no such
standards have yet been specified in the
regulations.25
The risks of charitable funds being diverted
into political violence are higher when they
are disbursed overseas especially into areas
of armed hostilities. Unfortunately, the ACNC
does not yet specifically address risks of
terrorism financing by Australian charities
operating abroad. The AUSTRAC/ACNC
2017 Risk Assessment for Australian
charities and non-profit organisations noted
that these problems are currently being
examined.
Managing
the Risk
Financing of Terrorism

of

Charitable

Australia recently took up a more active
stance to counter terrorism financing in
Southeast Asia, with implications for regional
charities. On 22 November 2017, a new
Counterterrorism Financing Working Group
was announced to combat terrorism funding
coming in to South East Asia from abroad
and to prevent financial support from going to
terrorist groups outside the region. The
regional working group is co-led by
AUSTRAC and the Philippines Anti-Money
Laundering Council. In addition, it was
announced in November 2017 that a new
regional Counter ISIS Financing Group would
be led by AUSTRAC. On 19 December 2017,
the Australian government launched a
24

“ACNC’s Role”, Australian Charities and Not For
Profits Commission
https://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/About_ACNC/ACNC
_role/ACNC/Edu/ACNC_role.aspx?TemplateType=P
(accessed December 31, 2017).
25
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits
Commission Act 2013, Commonwealth of Australia,
SLI No. 124, 2013.

program funded by AUD$50 million to
increase its international presence through
the AUSTRAC International Intelligence and
Regulatory Framework. An annual South
East Asian regional counter-terrorism
financing summit had already been
established as an international program and
has held three meetings hitherto.
At the domestic level, amendments were
introduced in 2017 to the Australian AntiMoney Laundering and Counter-Terrorism
Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF). In the 2017
AUSTRAC regional risk assessment for nonprofit organisations, virtual currency transfers
were identified as high-risk for financing
terrorism, as they are forms of value storage
and transfer that are easy to use but difficult
for authorities to monitor or detect misuse.
For the first time the proposed AML/CTF
reforms would regulate the emerging virtual
currency exchange sector. The current
regulatory regime applies to 'e-currency'
backed by a physical value, but not to a
digital currency such as Bitcoin, which is
based only on a cryptographic algorithm.
However, these amendments do not address
charitable funding of terrorism directly.
Public Funding
Abroad

of

Humanitarian

Aid

Terrorism financing through charities often
implicates governmental humanitarian aid or
development assistance where charities are
independent
delivery
partners.
The
Australian cases highlight questions for
managing aid projects in conflict-prone
environments: Should the risk management
regime be more demanding in conflict
zones? What are the due diligence
obligations of local and overseas managers
of charitable funds that may be diverted into
terrorism? How should responsibility be
distributed between governments, local
charities and the arms of charities abroad?
What risk management frameworks might be
realistically possible and most efficient for
operations overseas? How could they be
designed to be robust in conflict zones?
In the Australian case of charities that
operate abroad, the ACNC has not yet
specifically addressed terrorism financing. In
future, the ACNC will need to be more
situation-sensitive
in
performing
risk
assessment and to apply more rigorous
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preventive measures in higher risk
categories. Due diligence requirements
imposed on charities need to be calibrated
especially to manage risks of terrorism
support in overseas environments prone to
armed conflict. The utilisation of security
intelligence could be considered when the
risk factors and the track records of individual
Australian NGOs are assessed. The ACNC
counterterrorism education and checklist
programme could respond better to
differences across operating environments
overseas. External conduct standards
referred to in section 10-50 of the ACNC Act
could be elaborated in ACNC regulations and
charities could provide greater public
transparency for their overseas operations.
In order to address specifically the issue of
public funds which are provided by
government
agencies
to
non-profit
organisations, a set of mandatory conditions
appropriate to humanitarian relief in conflict
zones abroad should be instituted and
followed. A broad specification of best
practice measures could include: risk
assessment inputs from national intelligence
and
international
agencies;
financial
institution informational networking on
suspicious
transactions;
enhanced
technology
applications
for
financial
intelligence analysis; distinct regional risk
management codes; charity due diligence
performance agreements; self and third party
reporting; independent monitoring and
inspections;
public
transparency
and
accountability systems; public complaints
reception and response mechanisms;
adequate
administrative
and
human
resourcing; and the imposition of civil liability
and criminal sanctions on culpable charities
and individual officials.

these respective measures in terms of their
efficiency, effectiveness and costs.
Since governments provide substantial
amounts of humanitarian funds that can be
diverted into terrorism through partnerships
with charities operating overseas, regulations
and policies to suppress and eliminate this
perverse
occurrence
are
necessary.
Governments set the terms for the diligent
management of the funds that they provide
and can easily impose safeguards, even
where management is subcontracted to
charitable third parties operating in conflict
zones abroad. Positive outcomes are
urgently needed and readily available when
governments control the purse strings.
Gregory Rose is a member of Australian
National Centre for Ocean Resources and
Security (ANCORS), and Professor of Law,
School of Law at the University of
Wollongong, Australia. He can be contacted
at grose@uow.edu.au.

Further Research on Counter Measures
The measures suggested above are a few of
those available to suppress terrorism
financing in the charities and non-profit
sector within Australia and beyond. However,
further research is needed to evaluate them.
Case studies could focus on identifying
existing gaps or weaknesses in managing
governmental funds disbursed overseas into
areas of armed hostilities that have
previously resulted in diversion of those
funds into political violence. Furthermore,
they could clarify the practical dimensions of
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